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Abstract 
 
Sustainability standards for biofuel production calculated via life cycle accounting (LCA) require 
a certain reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions relative to gasoline.  Recently it has been 
shown that LCA gives biased results and should be extended to incorporate indirect land use 
change (iLUC).  We show that even including iLUCs, LCA is still biased and distorted because it 
is based on GHG emission and uptake calculations, which assume economic values only if (i) the 
environmental price of carbon is constant over time and (ii) the social discount rate (SDR) equals 
zero.  We offer a sustainability standard free of these restrictions, expressed in terms of a range 
of SDRs and a maximal GHG payback period.  Applying our methodology to Brazilian and U.S. 
data, we find that in Brazil conversion to biofuel production of two land types is genuinely 
sustainable, i.e., satisfies our sustainability standard, whereas in the United States no land type 
satisfies our criterion. Furthermore, the social value of CO2e savings by having the ethanol 
production from 12.8 million hectares of U.S. corn be produced in Brazil instead may be as high 
as $817.7 bil. 
 
* This paper is a slightly revised version of a background report on 31 July 2008 for the World 
Bank flagship report Climate Change in Latin America: Impact and Policy Challenges. An 
overview of the report is available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/17619_LowCarbonHighGrowth_English
_PDF.pdf 
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Towards a Genuine Sustainability Standard for Biofuel Production 
 
“Some people say ethanol is like cholesterol: there is a good one and a bad one. The good 
ethanol helps clean up the planet and is competitive. The bad ethanol depends on the fat of 
subsidies.”   President Lula, Brazil 02/06/2008. 
 
 Life-cycle accounting (LCA) analyses of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions found that 
U.S. corn-based ethanol decreases emissions 20 percent over 30 years compared with using 
gasoline (Farrell et al. 2006; Argonne 2008).  As a consequence, the Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007 (EISA) requires ethanol production to reduce emissions by at least 20 
percent.1  In contrast, Searchinger et al. (2008) found that substituting U.S. corn-based ethanol 
for gasoline increases GHGs by 93 percent over 30 years when indirect land use changes (iLUC) 
are accounted for (i.e., the conversion of uncultivated land in the United States and the rest of the 
world such as forest and grassland to cropland and so replace U.S. cropland diverted to ethanol).  
The U.S. Congress had explicitly required the assessment of iLUC in the EISA statute, requiring 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to assess the “significant indirect emissions such as 
significant emissions from land use changes.”  EPA was to report by October 2008 but has not 
yet done so.2  
 This situation raises several policy issues that the EPA should address:  Should the 20 
percent emission savings be lowered or should ethanol production be banned altogether?  Should 
regulations require GHG emissions to decline over 30 years or over a longer (or shorter) period?  
If GHG emission eventually decreases, does it mean that society benefits from ethanol 
production?  None of these questions can be adequately addressed by LCA -- with or without 
iLUCs.  This is because LCA is based on GHG balance calculations, i.e., comparing overall 
GHG emission with overall GHG uptake over periods of time (e.g., 30 years), and such balances 
interpreted as economic benefits or costs only if (i) the (environmental) price of carbon is 
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constant over time and (ii) the social discount rate (SDR) is zero.  Both conditions are 
inappropriate: the price of carbon increases over time as long as atmospheric GHG concentration 
increases (with its ensuing climate change induced threats); and a positive (though not 
necessarily constant) discount rate is required to determine intergenerational tradeoffs when 
economic growth is expected to persist (even at a reduced rate).  Existing sustainability standards 
(with or without iLUC) are therefore biased and distort the ensuing policy recommendation.  In 
this paper we develop a cost-benefit test for biofuel production which relaxes these assumptions 
and allows for a changing carbon price and a positive SDR, thereby offering a genuinely 
sustainable standard for biofuel production.   
 Our test is represented by a sustainability standard expressed in terms of a social discount 
rate (SDR) r and a GHG payback period n, holds for any non-decreasing carbon price series and 
is calculated from readily accessible data. The SDR has been the focus of the debate surrounding 
the Stern Review (Stern 2007).  By GHG payback period we mean the time before the overall 
GHG emission and uptake balance each other out.  Putting a limit (n) on this period is motivated 
by recent concerns that the more damaging consequences of global warming are those associated 
with abrupt climate change (Alley et al. 2003, Stern 2007, IPCC 2007).  Using Searchinger et 
al.’s (2008) data as an illustration, we find that two land types in Brazil pass the sustainability 
standard for any SDR r of 6 percent or less (in the range considered, e.g., by Cline 1992, Stern 
2007, Nordhaus 2007, Weitzman 2007 and Dasgupta 2007) and any GHG payback period n of 
15 years or less. On the other hand, no biofuel land conversion in the U.S. passes our 
sustainability standard with an SDR above 1.63 percent and payback period below 61 years.3 Our 
test is conservative as it requires that the biofuel crop is produced on land previously not in crop 
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production (i.e. converted land), thus avoiding controversy over how to measure iLUCs4 and 
impacts of biofuels on food prices.5 
 We also do an analysis of the global social gains that would occur if U.S. ethanol was 
produced in Brazil instead.  The social value of CO2e savings by having the ethanol production 
from 12.8 million hectares of U.S. corn be produced in Brazil instead may be as high as $817.7 
bil.  
2.   Costs and benefits of biofuel land conversion 
 The conversion of land from an original (pre-conversion) use to ethanol production 
entails both emission and uptake (sequestration) of GHGs (mainly CO2, nitrous oxides and 
methane, expressed in CO2 equivalent units and referred to as CO2e).  These emissions and 
uptakes depend on the soil type, its original use, the biofuel crop, and vary across geographical 
locations.  In the application below, we consider a variety of pre-conversion uses and land types 
in Brazil and the United States (see Table 1).  Emission occurs mostly at the conversion year, 
while uptake evolves gradually over time.  Accordingly, let C0 represent CO2e emission at the 
conversion time t = 0, measured in metric ton per hectare (MT ha−1), and let c1 = c2 – c3 
represent the net annual flow of CO2e uptake (emission if negative) of the biofuel crop from t = 1 
onward, measured in MT per hectare per year (MT ha−1 year−1).  Here c2 represents annual CO2e 
uptake by the biofuel crop and c3 is annual CO2e uptake by the pre-conversion use (e.g., forest or 
grassland uptake of CO2e) foregone due to conversion.   
Land conversion to ethanol production is beneficial vis-à-vis GHGs effects if the 
emission cost is smaller than the sequestration benefit.  Evaluating the cost and benefit requires 
expressing CO2e emissions and sequestrations in monetary terms at each point of time and 
discounting to a particular time period, say the conversion year.  The net balance of CO2e, i.e., 
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overall sequestration minus overall emission, assumes an economic value when (a) the price of 
carbon is constant over time, and (b) the social discount rate is zero.  Both conditions are at best 
questionable.  The carbon price reflects the cost of atmospheric GHG concentration and is 
expected to increase as long as the latter increases.  The SDR entails intergenerational tradeoffs 
and should be positive (though not necessarily constant) if economic growth is expected to 
persist (even at a reduced rate).   
To obtain a better grasp of the problem at hand it helps to view biofuel land conversion as 
a public project for which the investment cost is due to the CO2e emission at the time of 
conversion (C0) and the benefit comes from the net flow of carbon sequestration (c1).  Testing 
whether the project is desirable requires (i) expressing the CO2e sequestrations in monetary 
terms, (ii) calculating the present value of the sequestration flow, and (iii) comparing with the 
upfront emission cost.  Simply calculating CO2e balances distorts this test and may reverse its 
outcomes.   
Expressing CO2e emission or sequestration series in monetary terms require comparable 
carbon price series; evaluating the present value of a monetary series entails discounting.  We 
discuss discounting and carbon pricing in turn. 
2.1  Discounting 
It is difficult to overstate the role played by the social discount rate in cost benefit 
analyses of public projects.  And it is even more difficult to do so when the project under 
consideration extends into the distant future, as is the case when dealing with climate change 
consequences of GHG emissions.  A case in point is the recent controversy surrounding the Stern 
Review (Stern, 2007), which revolves around the parameters of the SDR (Dasgupta 2007, 
Nordhaus 2007, Weitzman 2007).  The SDR is often represented in the form r = δ + ηg, where δ 
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is the pure (utility) discount rate, η is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption and g is 
the growth rate of per capita consumption.  This expression separates between the two main 
motives of discounting, namely impatience (δ) and economic growth (ηg).  While discounting 
for impatience (or pure time discounting) is reasonable for private investments, it is harder to 
justify in public investments, as was forcefully argued by Ramsey (1928) and Pigou (1932).  Yet, 
assuming δ = 0 does not on its own imply a zero SDR, since the second term (ηg) is in general 
positive.  An average person today is about twice wealthier than his grandparents of two 
generations ago.  It is thus unreasonable to compare a unit of our grandparents’ income on a par 
with a unit of our income (as implied by a zero discount rate) – if only due to diminishing 
marginal utility which implies that this income unit is worth more to our (much poorer) 
grandparents (then) than to us (now).  If we expect economic growth to persist in the long run 
(even at a reduced rate of around 1 percent), we should allow for a positive SDR.  The above-
mentioned controversy revolves on the magnitude of the SDR – not whether or not it should be 
zero.   
Yet, standard LCA and Searchinger et al (2008, online supporting materials p. 16) use a zero 
discount rate, explaining this choice as follows:  
“... the choice of a discount rate, and even the decision whether to select a constant 
discount rate, a varying but continuous discount rate, or a discontinuous discount rate, 
reflects an enormous range of technical and policy judgments... These are matters of great 
uncertainty that the selection of a discount rate has to treat as certain.  The incorporation 
of a discount rate directly into the model to count today the value of future reductions 
therefore has great potential to obscure the actual effect on emissions of biofuels for 
policy-makers in the near-term” 
   
Indeed the quotation lists nicely the various concerns associated with discounting public projects 
that extend into the distant future.  Yet it leaves one puzzled as to how a zero discount rate 
addresses any of these concerns.  Economists have long been troubled by the adverse 
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implications of committing to a constant discount rate (see, the review by Groom et al. 2005), 
and the numerous approaches offered in the literature are based in one way or another on 
declining discount rates (e.g., Chichilinsky 1996, 1997, Weitzman 1998, 1999, Arrow 1999, 
Cropper and Laibson 1999, Karp 2005, Dasgupta and Maskin 2005).  Committing to a zero 
discount rate has rarely been advocated because it resolves none of the limitations of a constant 
rate specification, and there is nothing magical about zero that makes it less arbitrary than, say, a 
2 percent discount rate when economic growth is expected to persist (even at a reduced rate).6  
 Our approach here is to allow for a plausible range of SDRs, such that the cost-benefit 
criterion (developed below) applies to any SDR in this range.  In the context of GHG emission -
induced climate change, the parameters assigned to δ, η and g give rise to SDR values between 
1.4 percent (Cline 1992, Stern 2007), 5 – 6 percent (Nordhaus 2007, Weitzman 2007) and even 
higher. This suggests an SDR range of up to 6 percent.  
 Because the cost of land conversion (due to emission of GHG) occurs at the conversion 
time and the benefit (due to GHG uptakes) evolves gradually over time, assuming a zero SDR is 
more favorable to land conversion as compared with the case when a positive SDR is assumed.  
Thus, Searchinger et. al’s (2008) conclusions against land conversion remain valid also under a 
positive SDR.  However, it is possible that land conversion to biofuel production is found 
beneficial under a zero SDR but not under a positive SDR, as the empirical example below, 
based on Searchinger et. al’s (2008) data, demonstrates.   
2.2  Carbon pricing 
 The carbon price at time t, denoted Pt, is the shadow price of atmospheric GHG 
concentration.  This price represents our willingness-to-pay to remove one metric ton (MT) of 
CO2e from the atmosphere (or, alternatively, for preventing the emission of one MT of CO2e) at 
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time t.  This would have been the price of a permit to emit one MT of CO2e during year t had 
efficient markets for such permits been present.  For a number of reasons such efficient markets 
do not exist and we can only use estimates of Pt.7  Possible estimates are the carbon tax series 
generated by integrated assessment models (IAMs), such as Nordhaus' DICE (Nordhaus and 
Boyer 2000) or the PAGE model used by Stern (2007).  Evidently, these price series vary from 
IAM to IAM (see, e.g., Figure 1 in Nordhaus 2007, p. 699), so that tying our analysis to a 
particular series will undermine the robustness of our results.  Our cost-benefit test, therefore 
only relies on the property that Pt does not decrease with atmospheric GHG concentration, hence 
with time (as long as GHG concentration does not decrease with time).  It is convenient to use 
the normalized carbon price pt = Pt/P0, which (for a non-decreasing Pt series) satisfies p0 = 1 and 
pt ≥ 1, t=1,2,… . 
3.    A genuine sustainability standard  
 Given a normalized carbon price series pt ≥ 1, t = 0,1,2,…, and an SDR r, the present 
value of a net CO2e uptake process ct, t=1,2,…., is  ∑∞= −+1 )1(t ttt rcp .  For the case under 
consideration, the sequestration flow is constant, ct = c1, and the present value specializes to 
∑∞= −+11 )1(t tt rpc . Invoking pt ≥ 1 gives rcrcrpc
t
t
t
t
t /)1()1( 1
1
1
1
1 =+≥+ ∑∑ ∞
=
−∞
=
− . The cost of the 
(mostly upfront) emission C0 at the conversion time is p0C0 = C0.  Thus, c1/r ≥ C0, or equivalently 
r ≤ c1/C0, ensures that biofuel land conversion pays off (vis-à-vis its GHGs effects).  We 
conclude that c1/C0 constitutes an upper bound on the set of SDRs r for which the present value 
of the CO2e sequestration flow does not fall short of the cost of emission for any non-decreasing 
carbon price series Pt.  We thus require that 
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r
C
c ≥
0
1 ,                                                                                                         (1) 
where r  is an upper bound on the set of plausible SDR values.  With the guide of the above-
mentioned debate about the Stern Review, r  = 6 percent constitutes a plausible SDR range.  
 The various land conversion situations in Table 1 are characterized by C0 and c1.  If 
condition (1) is satisfied, then the benefit generated by the GHG uptake flow (at the constant rate 
c1) exceeds the cost inflicted by the GHG emission C0 (that occurs at the conversion time) for 
any SDR rr ≤  and for any non-decreasing carbon price series Pt.  Put differently, the present 
value of the net flow of CO2e uptakes will eventually outweigh the cost of the upfront emission 
C0 for any SDR at or below r  and for any non-decreasing carbon price series Pt.   
 However, this eventual state of affairs may take a long time to occur—too long to be of 
much use if in the meantime the GHG-induced climate change has caused substantial damage.  
This concern stems from alarming evidence that some of the catastrophic consequences of global 
warming will be inflicted abruptly at dates that cannot be predicted a priori (Alley et al. 2003, 
Stern 2007, IPCC 2007).  The risk associated with abrupt climate change is represented by a 
hazard rate function that depends on the atmospheric concentration of GHGs and measures, at 
each point of time, the risk of immediate occurrence of a catastrophic event given that the event 
has not yet occurred (see Tsur and Zemel 1996, 1998, 2008).  Since most of the GHGs emission 
induced by land conversion occurs upfront and the compensation in the form of GHG uptake 
evolves gradually over time, initially land conversion contributes positively to atmospheric GHG 
concentration, thereby increasing the occurrence hazard of abrupt climate change.  This calls for 
placing a limit on the time it takes for the accumulated GHG uptake to balance out the upfront 
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emission.  For example, Searchinger et al. (2008, p. 16 online supporting materials) suggest a 
time limit of about 30 years, stating that  
“... from a global-warming perspective, crop-based biofuels are generally viewed as at 
most a short-term strategy to provide immediate reductions in greenhouse gasses as the 
world pursues more transformative energy strategies… Emission reductions during early 
years will also be more expensive than maintaining those reductions in the long-term 
once technologies have evolved. For these reasons, we believe the net impact on 
greenhouse gas emissions over a 30 year period provides a reasonable test of greenhouse 
impacts....……The IPCC has specifically warned against delaying emissions reductions 
because of the risk of harsh, long-term, unavoidable impacts without immediate 
reductions. Strategies that increase emissions over a 30 year period require offsetting 
additional reductions over that period to achieve near-term goals, and those additional 
offsetting reductions must be achieved at the highest point of the cost curve.” 
   
The Gallagher Report (Renewable Fuels Agency 2008) requires a shorter payback period of 10 
year.  As in the case of the SDR, there is no objective prescription that justifies a particular time 
limit and more than a shred of value judgment together with subjective risk assessments are 
needed.  We now incorporate a payback time limit and obtain our sustainability standard.  
 Let n represent a (pre-specified) maximal period allowed for the accumulated GHG 
uptake (nc1) to compensate for the upfront emission (C0).  Then, we require that nc1 ≥ C0, which 
together with condition (1) gives our sustainability standard 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧≥
n
r
C
c 1,max
0
1                                                                                                           (2) 
in terms of an SDR upper bound r  and a GHG payback time limit n.  We say that land 
conversion to biofuel production is genuinely sustainable if it satisfies (2).  Thus, a land 
conversion situation (characterized by C0 and c1) is genuinely sustainable if c1/C0 does not 
exceed r  and C0/c1 does not exceed n.  We turn now to check whether production of corn 
ethanol in the U.S. and sugarcane ethanol in Brazil are genuinely sustainable. 
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4.    Ethanol production in the United States and Brazil 
 Table 1 presents C0, c1, c1/C0 and C0/c1 associated with converting various land types for 
sugarcane ethanol in Brazil and corn ethanol in the United States.  The emission and uptake 
calculations are based on data from Searchinger et al. (2008).  We see that converting a hectare 
of Cerrado in Brazil for sugarcane ethanol production is genuinely sustainable at any SDR at or 
below 6.78% and any n at or above 15 years – well within the [0,6%] SDR range, which 
accommodates most commentators of the Stern Review, and the time limit advocated by 
Searchinger et al. (2008).  Converting grassland for sugarcane ethanol production in Brazil is 
genuinely sustainable at any SDR at or below %93.23=r  and any time limit at or above n = 4 
years.  
 In the United States, on the other hand, no land type conversion to corn ethanol 
production is genuinely sustainable at any SDR above 1.63% and any n below 61 years.  Under 
the SDR upper bound of 6 percent and the payback period of 30 years, the conversion of two 
land types in Brazil are genuinely sustainable while in the United States, no land type conversion 
possesses this property.  
 It is worth emphasizing that, consistent with Searchinger et al.’s (2008) extension of LCA 
to account for indirect land use effects, our sustainability standards require that conversion to 
biofuel must be from land currently not in food production.  This is so because converting land 
from food production (e.g., corn for animal feed) into ethanol production entails some 
conversion emission but no net sequestration, since the GHG withdrawal of the ethanol corn (c2) 
is the same (or very similar) to the foregone withdrawal of the feed corn (c3), as revealed by 
LCA calculations (see, for example, Table 1 of Searchinger et al. 2008, which shows that when a 
ethanol corn displaces feed corn the GHG saving is negative).  Our sustainability condition, thus, 
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requires that conversion to biofuel production must use idle land or land not in agricultural use.  
This feature makes our standard conservative as it avoids direct effects of biofuels on staple food 
prices and avoids controversy over how to measure iLUCs.   
 Finally we note that the results in Table 1 possibly understate the potential advantage of 
ethanol production in Brazil relative to production the United States due to the difference in 
potential yield increase in both countries.  If the state-of-the-art technology used for corn 
production in the United States were applied to sugar cane production in Brazil, sugar cane 
production could be significantly increased (by 30 percent according to Wiebe 2008, and by 2-3 
fold according to Kishore 2008).   
5. Policy simulations 
We simulate the social value of GHG savings if all ethanol production in the United 
States was required to be produced in Brazil. This may seem as a hypothetical exercise but 
actually it has some realistic aspects. It is widely agreed that if there were no subsidies for 
feedstocks or ethanol in the United States in the past (and no import tariff), then it is highly 
likely that ethanol would be imported into the United States instead of produced domestically.  
Furthermore, U.S. ethanol production is expected to double by 2015 and the simulation provides 
a first order approximation of the welfare gain associated with producing the ethanol in Brazil 
instead. Finally, a regulation that results in U.S. ethanol production shifting to Brazil is similar to 
the current 0,1 sustainability thresholds employed by the United States and under consideration 
in the European Union. 
We simulate a reversal of the Searchinger et al. (2008) exercise where the ethanol 
currently produced from the 12.8 million hectares of corn in the United States are produced in 
Brazil instead. The CO2e costs reported in Searchinger et al. (2008) are now reversed and 
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become savings. We assume the ethanol can only be produced on converted land and must be on 
grassland or the Cerrado.  Because the ethanol yield per hectare is about twice that in Brazil 
compared to the United States, only 6.4 mil. hectares of land need to be converted into ethanol 
production in Brazil in order to produce current U.S. ethanol production levels.8  The benefit due 
to saving the CO2e emission in the United States is ($t=0 ha-1) 
 ∑∞
=
+−=
1
100 )1/(
t
tUSA
t
USAUSA rCPCPB  
The cost per hectare associated with the CO2e emission in Brazil is ($t=0 ha-1) 
 ∑∞
=
+−=
1
100 )1/(
t
tB
t
BBrazil rCPCPC  
The overall benefit is given by 
6 6 6
0 0 0 1 1
1
1 112.8 10 6.4 10 12.8 10
2 2 (1 )
USA Brazil USA B Brazil USA t
t
t
pB B P C C C C
r
∞
=
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞× × − × × = × − + −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥+⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∑  
where it is recalled that pt = Pt/P0, p0 = 1 and pt ≥ 1.  Since (see Table 1) 
02.48.12/18
2
1
11 >=−=− USABrasil CC  and rr
p
t
t
t 1
)1(1
≥+∑
∞
=
, we can bound the above benefit from 
below by   
 6 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 112.8 10
2 2
USA Brazil Brazil USAP C C C C
r
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞× − + −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦    
Results in Table 2 indicate that the world’s welfare gain due to change in GHG emissions 
ranges from a high of $817.7 bil. (grassland under Nordhaus’s (2007a) interpretation of Stern’s 
(2007) analysis) to a low of $30.8 bil. (on Cerrado with Nordhaus’s (2007a) discount rate). Using 
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Stern’s (2008) price $48 (30 euro) per tonne CO2 (p. 9), the social value of having U.S. ethanol 
produced in Brazil instead is valued between $421.3 bil. and $480.2 bil., a significant savings.  
If the carbon price Pt increases linearly in time for about a century at a slope α and then 
levels off, the welfare gains can be more precisely approximated by  
6
0 0 0 1 1
1 1 112.8 10
2 2
USA Brazil Brazil USAP C C C C
r
α⎡ + ⎤⎛ ⎞× − + −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦  .  
Thus, the figures in Table 2 underestimate the benefit by 6 0 1 1
112.8 10
2
Brazil USAP C C
r
α⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞× −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ .  
Based on Nordhaus (2007), the slope of the carbon price is approximately α = 1.36 or α = 0.272 
under r = 1.4% or r = 5.5%, respectively. We find that the benefits presented in Table 2 
underestimate the true benefits by $10.402 billion under r = 1.4% and by $0.206 billion under 
r = 5.5%.  
6.    Concluding comments 
 Current sustainability standards for biofuel land conversion adopted by the United States 
and the European Union are biased – with or without Searchinger et al.’s (2008) extension 
incorporating indirect land use changes (iLUC).  The reason is that these standards are based on 
CO2e balance calculations, thus implicitly assume that the price of carbon remains constant over 
time and that the social discount rate (SDR) is zero.  The cost-benefit procedure developed here 
addresses these shortcomings.  We formulate a condition to ensure that the present value of the 
monetary flow of GHGs uptakes will eventually exceed the emission cost for all social discount 
rate (SDR) values at or below a pre-specified threshold r  and all non-decreasing carbon price 
series.  Motivated by risks of abrupt climate change, we also require that the payback period (the 
time it takes for the accumulated GHG uptake to fully compensate for the upfront emission) does 
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not exceed a pre-specified length n.  Put together, these conditions form a sustainability standard 
that can be calculated from readily available data.    
 Our procedure is not free of value judgment, as it relies on two thresholds: an SDR 
threshold r  and a payback period threshold n.  The former has been the centerpiece of the recent 
debate surrounding the Stern Review (Stern 2007); the latter is part of existing sustainability 
standard (see, e.g., the Gallagher Review -- Renewable Fuels Agency 2008).  Our procedure uses 
these thresholds in a way that is consistent with cost-benefit analysis and with the risks 
associated with abrupt climate change.    
 The empirical analysis, based on Searchinger et al.’s (2008) data, is illustrative in that we 
only look at two countries and two feedstocks producing one biofuel.  More comprehensive 
empirical testing should be done on other countries, feedstocks and biofuels to get a better 
understanding of the sustainability standards offered here.  The data underlying our analysis are 
constantly being updated and an “industry standard” or “best practice” method should be 
developed over time (just like with standard LCA in the past).  
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Table 1: Data on GHG emission and uptake for various land types in Brazil and  
    the United States 
 
 C0  c1 c1/C0 C0/c1 
Land type 
Upfront 
CO2e 
emission 
(MT ha-1) 
Net flow of 
CO2e uptake 
(MT ha-1 year-1) 
  
      
Brazil     
Tempef 739.6 14.7 1.98% 50 
Tropef 823.9 18.0 2.18% 46 
Tropsf 603.8 16.9 2.80% 36 
Tempsf 489.9 18.0 3.67% 27 
Tropof (Cerrado) 265.3 18.0 6.78% 15 
Grassland 75.2 18.0 23.93% 4 
     
United States       
Coniferous Pacific 880.8 -1.2 -  - 
Mixed forest 770.8 0.3 0.04% 2700 
Broadleaf forest 688.2 -0.5 -  - 
Woodland 413.0 1.6 0.39% 259 
Coniferous/Mountain 642.3 1.8 0.28% 357 
Chaparral 220.2 1.8 0.82% 122 
Grassland 110.1 1.8 1.63% 61 
Source: Calculated using data from Searchinger et al. (2008). 
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Table 2: Social value of having U.S. ethanol produced 
in Brazil
  Cerrado Grassland or desert 
 
Nordhaus on  
Stern 
 
r = 1.4% 
P0 = 81.7 
 
$718.2 bil. 
 
$817.7 bil. 
 
Stern r = 1.4%          P0 = 48 
         $421.3 bil.           $480.2 bil.  
 
Nordhaus 
 
r = 5.5% 
P0 = 8.17 
         $30.8 bil.           $40.7 bil. 
 
Source: calculated
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 California’s low-carbon standard targets additional savings in GHG emissions while the Commission of the 
European Communities developed a directive for the European Parliament that biofuels emit 35% less GHGs than 
gasoline. 
 
2 California's low-carbon standard is also being revised to factor in the impact of biofuels on land use, with the 
California Air Resources Board to implement the (yet unannounced) rules in April 2009. Meanwhile, the EU has 
recently ordered the inclusion of iLUCs in the LCA calculation of their sustainability standard, where the outcome is 
also in abeyance. 
 
3 The Searchinger et al. (2008) study highlighted the possibility that ethanol from Brazilian sugarcane is an 
exception: “the extraordinary productivity of Brazilian sugarcane merits special future analysis.” Using a different 
methodology, our study confirms this possibility but only for two land types. 
 
4 To empirically calculate all indirect effects would be a huge exercise and the chances of getting agreement at the 
national (let alone international) level would be slim. Our sustainability standard is based on land conversion, 
thereby sidestepping the controversy over iLUC by assuming it is 100 percent. Standard direct LCA is basically 
input-output analysis. To include all indirect effects (for land and non-land inputs as well as for output) would 
require measuring impact multipliers of a linear programming model of the entire world economy.  
 
5 The iLUC argument overlooks indirect uses of inputs other than land that would also need to be measured as well 
as “indirect output use effects” - ethanol may not replace gasoline but replace coal instead, giving a credit to ethanol 
production. Just as Searchinger et al. (2008) showed that it is erroneous to assume that all agricultural production on 
land diverted to ethanol production is not replaced, it may also be erroneous to assume that all output (in this case, 
gasoline) is replaced with the ethanol production. In other words, there may be “indirect output use changes” as 
well. This is ignored in the literature. Oil is generally thought of as “finite” while coal is considered “unlimited in 
supply”, implying that if the supply curve for oil is vertical and the supply curve for coal is flat, then biofuels do not 
replace any oil but replaces coal instead, which emits 40 percent more CO2 per BTU than oil.  
 
6 Some economists argue that CO2e emissions (or the damages therefrom) cannot be discounted because emissions 
increase the accumulated stock of GHGs and so the damage done is a cumulative function of GHGs emitted over 
time. The claim is that the correct measure should be some present value price of each year. This criticism is 
incorporated in our analysis through the price of carbon – the marginal cost of the GHG stock. If you add to that 
stock each year, you increase the cost by the carbon price which is incorporated in our analysis. 
  
7 Efficient markets for emission permits do not exist partly because of the long time span and the vast uncertainties 
associated with the chain of events that begins at GHG emissions and accumulation in the atmosphere, continues 
with the effect of GHG concentration on average warming, and ends at damages inflicted by the global warming. 
 
8 Of the 12.8 mil. hectares of corn devoted to ethanol production, 2.245 mil. hectares are converted directly in the 
United States and 10.555 mil. hectares diverted from existing corn or alternative crops in the United States. Of the 
latter, 8.572 mil. hectares are indirectly converted from forests and grasslands in the United States and rest of the 
world, while 1.983 mil. hectares are indirectly diverted from alternative crops in the United States and the rest of the 
world. Having Brazil produce this ethanol instead, there are savings in upfront CO2e emissions on 10.817 mil. 
hectares plus the added value of annual CO2 sequestration of the 2.245 mil. hectares that is converted back to forests 
in the United States. However, there is a loss of annual net sequestration of the land devoted to ethanol production in 
the United States. Brazil requires only half the land to produce the same amount of ethanol (6.4 mil. hectares) and 
obtains a higher annual net sequestration of CO2e from ethanol as well. 

